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NOTES
Moore: Public Rights
in Public Lands
PUBLIC RIGHTS IN PUBLIC LANDS
INTRODUCTION

The management of state la.ds epitomizs, in many respects, the
need for comprehensive planning by governmental agencies. A single
acre of land has many diversified and often competing uses, and a
potential return which spans decades. The isolated land management
decision, channeled through its sometimes subtle ramifications, may
affect numerous collateral interests. Since we live in a world of limited
resources, upon which are made unlimited demands, a comprehensive,
total approach to land management is vital to our continued physical
and economic well being. A proposed land development which offers
the alluring promise of immediate return often carries with it a potential
for destructiveness. A decision which enables one interest to use land
without regard to other values may result in the reduction or destruction
of future land productivity. Fish and wildlife, miles removed, may
be victims of the shortsighted decision. Unforeseen yet harsh economic
and social pressures may be imposed upon surrounding municipalities.
Land management is inherently complex, and land management decisions
are uncomfortably far reaching.

The very nature of land management reveals the need for managing
bodies, such as the State Board of Land Commissioners, to act in a planning capacity. The responsible administration of state lands requires
clear guidelines and comprehensive overviews, aimed at the long range
good. Legal machinery is needed to insure that our state lands will
be managed to assure maximum present and future productivity. We
can no longer afford the luxury of wearing blinders into land management decisions. We can no longer afford the luxury of short term gain
wrought at the expense of long term losses. Resource planning is an area
where "buy now, pay later" is too potentially catastrophic to be permitted.
THE EXAMPLE
On March 18 and April 8, 1970, public hearings were conducted before the Montana State Department of Health,' the Montana State Fish
and Game Department,2 and the Montana State Water Resources Board3
acting in pursuance to an official request of the Montana State Board
of Land Commissioners.4
The hearings were not required by law, nor were the various boards
required, by law, to act in this advisory capacity. The Anaconda Copper
Mining Company had found it "necessary" to request an easement on

'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,
'R.C.M.1947, § 26-106.

§ 69-103 (1947)

[hereinafter cited as R.C.M.1947].

'R.C.M.1947, § 89-103.1.
'MONT. CONsT., Art. XVII, § 1; R.C.M.1947, §§ 81-101 et. seq.
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state lands for a proposed open pit mining operation." The target area
was the untouched mountain region at the headwaters of the Blackfoot
River near Lincoln, Montana, a favorite recreational area for many
Montanans. Because of this projected location, and because of concern
regarding mining practices, 6 the request immediately sparked a heated
public reaction. The response was a decision by the Land Board to
conduct two public hearings.
Since the hearings were not statutory, the procedural format was
left to the discretion of the Land Board. The first hearing was to be
restricted to the presentation of the Anaconda Company statement, 7 and
to the proposals from the Hearing Board.' The Anaconda Company was
not required to respond to the concern which had predicated the hearings, nor was anyone allowed to be cross-examined. The hearings were
therefore limited from their inception, to something less than a comprehensive planning tool.
The second hearing, held April 8, 1970 was the public's opportunity
to be heard. Thirty-seven statements were presented,9 ten of which
favored the immediate easement grant, although cognizant of the development's potentially adverse affect on the environment.' 0 While no

50r so they had claimed at the March, 1970 State Board of Land Commissioner's
meeting [hereinafter cited as Land Board], in their plea for the immediate grant
of requested easements. They were unable to substantiate the urgency of their request,
and in the face of heated public opposition, the Land Board deferred judgment.
'See, e.g., Great Falls Tribune, October 9, 1968 at 5, col. 1; Great Falls Tribune,
December 6, 1969, at 5, col. 3, in connection with Forbes, March 1, 1970; Great Falls
Tribune, December 31, 1969, at 13, col. 6; Great Falls Tribune, February 7, 1969, at
7, col. 1 and at 20, col. 1; Great Falls Tribune, February 15, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
'First hearing on the Heddleston Mining Development, March 18, 1970, [hereinafter
cited as 1st Heddleston Hearing] before the special advisory board to the Land Board.
It is noteworthy that the Anaconda Company statement was so preliminary that,
despite expressing the urgent need for immediate easement grants, the company was
not yet "in a position to indicate whether or not the property . . .'"would ever
".. . be brought into production." Anaconda Company Statement, at 1.
'1st Heddleston Hearing, supra note 7; Statements of the Fish and Game Dept., The
Montana Water Resources Board, and the Montana State Department of Health.
'Second Hearing on the Heddleston Mining Development, April 8, 1970 [hereinafter
cited as 2nd Heddleston Hearing], before the special advisory board to the Land Board.
'IOt was the classic struggle between those arguing the need for new tax sources, and
of those demanding the prevention of environmental degradation. The ends sought
by both sides were legitimate. Consequently, the majority of the statements read like
negative pregnants, i.e., admitting one value while stressing the other.
The immediate grant of the easements was urged on the ground that the revenue
therefrom was necessary to the state, the county, and the community of Lincoln. (See
'Statement of Thomas M. Powers", infra note 11, for a view that the demand for
new public services might render the magnitude of such economic benefit illusory.)
Proponents of the development countered environmental objections by urging that
the company would be required to abide by the Montana law. (For a view on the
insufficiency of Montana pollution laws, see "Statement of Lester R. Rusoff", infra
note 11.)
Montana's ex-national N.B.C. news commentator, Chet Huntley, suggested that
the easements be granted on the ground that the Anaconda Company had been required to put up a bond insuring environmental nondegradation. While such a bond
might have accomplished this end, no such bond had been required nor, for that
matter, requested.
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one opposed the development, per se, twenty-seven statements urged
postponement of the final decision until more information was available,
preliminary studies were completed, and alternatives were investigated."
In making their final decision the Land Board was able to exercise

great discretion. The hearing board had been advisory only, and no
statute had imposed a standard to be followed. The Land Board granted
the easement, but appended eleven conditions.1 2 The majority of these
conditions required nothing of the Anaconda Company which was not
required in the absence of these conditions.' 3 Condition eleven, however,
required the Anaconda Company, upon termination of the easement, to
reclaim that land "covered by the easement.' 1 4 The insertion of this
condition, however, proved too much. The Anaconda Company withdrew
its request, and intimated that should it desire to proceed, it would do
so on its own lands.' 5

uThe immediate grant of the easement was opposed on the ground that the development
had not been justified economically, '' Statement of Dorothy Bradley' ', 2nd Heddleston
Hearing, April 8, 1970, and on the ground that economic considerations alone no
longer justified such a carte blanche grant. 'Statement of Mr. Cecil Garland', 2nd
Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970.
The pertinent history of the Anaconda Company was outlined and cited as authority for taking safeguards in advance. "Statement of Bernard D. Shanks", 2nd
Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970.
A concern for the health of workers employed in the Anaconda Smelter was submitted, with a request that the grant be delayed until it could be shown that the
Heddleston development would not add to the already serious condition. "Statement
of Dr. C.C. Gordon", 2nd Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970, presented by Phil
Torangeau.
A proposal that soil porosity and permability tests precede any final determination was presented. "Statement of Professor of Geol., Arnold Silverman", 2nd
Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970, presented by David Alt.
The insufficiency of sealants was raised. "Statement of Professor of Zool.,
George F. Weisel", 2nd Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970.
The paucity of available facts and the potentially adverse economic and sociologic
impact of the development on the town of Lincoln, itself, were offered as reasons
for postponing the final decision. "Statement of lecturer in Economics, Thomas M.
Power", 2nd Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970.
The inadequacy of present pollution law and the difficulty in enforcing those
provisions presently available was cited as a necessary consideration, ''Statement of
Professor of Law, Lester R. Rusoff", 2nd Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970, presented by Cindy Price, and drew support from the statement of the League of Women
Voters of Montana.
In addition, it was urged that ground water and seasonal high water studies
precede final Land Board action, and that the Anaconda Company should be required to make available plans for the transportation of ore. This writer had the
opportunity to suggest the creation of a model project, aimed at long range comprehensiveness, and the integration of conflicting, competing interests. "Statement
of James D. Moore", 2nd Heddleston Hearing, April 8, 1970.
"See "Proposed Conditions for the Granting of the Lincoln Easement", Land Board
Meeting, May 20, 1970.
"Conditions one through four required, essentially, the submission of certain plans to
the Water Pollution Control Council for approval, before the commencement of operations. This was already required under R.C.M.1947, §§ 69-4806, 69-4807. Condition
number five demanded that the Anaconda Company promise to comply with conditions one through four. Condition six restated conditions one through four in yet
another way: ' (6) Anaconda agrees to obtain all necessary permits from the appropriate pollution control agencies . . ." Condition seven stated: "Anaconda agrees
to comply with all current air and water pollution control laws .
"See Proposed Conditions, supra note 12.
'Recalling, of course, an earlier claim that the project could not proceed without the
requested easements, supra note 5.
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The Heddleston Hearings thus concluded, visibly, where they had
begun. This writer believes, however, that in so doing four fundamental
objectives were served.
First, they indicated the need for comprehensive, long range planning in land management. They served to reveal the public sentiment
that the future role of the Land Board must be as a planning agency.
Second, they provided an insight into the inherent complexity of
environmental considerations, and exemplified the usefulness of the
public hearing as a tool for providing information.
Third, they voiced the immense public concern over environmental
and collateral considerations, as these relate to land management decisions. They manifest the inadequacy of short-term economic return
as the land-management yardstick.
Finally, these hearings made it clear that the public desires a voice
in land-management decisions, and that the realities of responsible planning often require that the public be permitted that voice.
TIlE LAW
Under the Montana Constitution all lands of the state are public
lands and arc held in trust1 6 for the people.1 7 The State Board of Land
Commissioners, composed of the governor, the superintendent of public
instruction, the secretary of state, and the attorney general, are charged
with the duties of managing these lands.1 s
The lands themselves are divided into four classifications' 9 and

must be managed pursuant to the rules and regulations prescribed therefor by law.20 Although the classifications set forth in the MT[ontana
Constitution have persevered to date, a provision vas included by which
such classifications could be changed or expanded to meet the particular
2
exigencies of future times. '

"For an enlightening discussion of developments in the public trust doctrine see Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural Resource Law, 1 ENV. L. REV. 599. See also
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN WATER LAW 137 (Johnson and Lewis eds. 1970).
17MONT. CONST., Art. XVII, § 1.
i".. . shall have the direction, control, leasing, and sale of the school lands of the
state . . . ", MONT. CONST., Art. XI, § 4; and "I.. . shall be the governing board of
the department of state lands and investments; it shall have and exercise general
authority, direction and control over the care, management and disposition of all
state lands . . ." R.C.M.1947, § 81-103.
"These include those lands valuable for grazing purposes, those valuable for the timber
upon them, those valuable in agriculture, and those which fall within the limits of
any town or city, or which fall within a three mile radius thereof. MONT. COuST.
Art. XVII, §§ 1, 2.
OMONT. CONST., Art. XVII, § 2.
... provided, that any of said lands may be reclassified whenever, by any reason
of increased facilities for irrigation or otherwise, they shall be subject to different
classification." MONT. CONST., Art. XVII, § 2.
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The standards or guidelines to which the Land Board must adhere
in the management of state lands are minimal. The only constitutional
restriction on the disposition of these lands is a requirement that the
full
arket
lu - 2 of any land disposed of he secured to the state2

Although the Constitution also provided that the administration of state
24
lands would be subject to the "rules and regulations prescribed by law,"
and that

"

none of such land

.

shall ever be disposed of except

in pursuance of the general laws providing for such disposition, . . .
the legislature has not gone far toward molding a more workable
standard. The lands must be held in trust "for the support of education and for the attainment of other worthy objects helpful to the
well-being of the people of this state, ' 26 and must be so administered as
to secure the largest measure of "legitimate and reasonable advantage"
27
to the state.
The courts have rightfully interpreted these legislative land management standards as vesting in the Land Board a large degree of
discretionary power over the subject of the trust. 2 So long as the
Board acts short of clear abuse, that discretion is virtually unlimited.
While this permits a wide latitude and great flexibility in land managemeat, (which is, to a degree, necessary to responsible planning), the
absence of a more refined standard carries with it a diversity of draw29
backs, such as the difficulty of review of Land Board decisions.

CONST., Art. XVII, § 1. For an interesting split of authority as to what
constitutes ''market value" contrast the test in Rider v. Cooney, 94 Mont. 295, 305
et. seq., 23 P.2d 261 (1933), with that applied in Thompson v. Babcock, 146 Mont.
46, 52, 409 P.2d 808 (1968).
'It is now well settled that the term "lands" includes mineral rights, Texas Pac. Coal
and Oil Co. v. State, 125 Mont. 258, 260, 234 P.2d 452, (1951); and that the leasing
of lands for a term of years is the disposal of an "interest" or 'estate'' in such
2 lands, within the purview of MONT. CONST., Art. XVII, § 1, Rider, supra note 22 at 308.
lSee R.C.M.1947, §§ 81-101 through 81-2304.
2MONT.

2MONT. CONsT., Art. XVII,

§

1.

-R.C.M.1947, § 81-103.

wqId.

'See State ex. rel. Gravely v. Stewart, 48 Mont. 347, 349, 137 P. 854 (1913); See also,
Leuthold v. Brandjord, 100 Mont. 96, 106, 47 P.2d 41 (1935), and Thompson v.
Babcock, supra note 22 at 54.
"This is immediately apparent to anyone searching the limited amount of pertinent
case law. In a case frequently alluded to in Land Board litigation, involving the
State Board of Equalization, the court stated: ". . . having proceeded in the matter,
exercising its own judgment and discretion, in the absence of any statutory provision
directing how the board should proceed, and in the absence of fraud . . . the court
is powerless to compel the board to proceed in any particular manner . . .'
State
v. State Board of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413, 414, 186 P. 699 (1920).
Another case, involving the Land Board itself, constitutes an equally poignant
expression on the limited character of land management review. Here, the plaintiff
was provided with notice of a land sale which contained the wrong date, and therefore
was deprived of his opportunity to bid. The court stated that the "Board, in determining whether it shall approve or reject a sale, acts quasi-judicially, and unless
there has been a manifest abuse of discretion, the courts will not interfere . . ."
State ex. rel. Robbins v. Bonner, 128 Mont. 45, 49, 270 P.2d 400 (1954). See
also State ex. rel. Gravely v. Stewart, 48 Mont. 347, 350, 137 P. 854 (1913); State
ex. rel. Harris v. District Court, 27 Mont. 280, 281, 70 P. 981 (1902); and Mont. Ore.
Pur. Co. v. Lindsay, 25 Mont. 24, 27, 63 P. 715 (1901).
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It is this writer's opinion that Montana land management law, while
constitutionally sound, lacks the statutory machinery necessary to insure
the proper administration of public lands. There are no provisions requiring public hearings nor, for that matter, for notice of impending

sales of state lands.30 There are no standards to guide the Land Board
toward
actions,
ficient,
it has
absence
by the

responsible planning, no standards by which to check their
and no provisions for judicial review. Where the law is sufas in requiring complete minutes of Land Board meetings,3 '
been customarily ignored. 3 2 Judicial review, impeded by the
of a standard and of a provision therefor, is made impossible
absence of a record.

When construed in light of the susceptibility of the Land Board3a
to political and economic pressures,3 4 the present law lacks adequate
safeguards. Viewed in light of the tremendous task of truly coniprehensive and long range land management, the present law lacks teeth.
This writer is therefore compelled to suggest certain elements which
are not incorporated in our present law, but which this writer believes
to be fundamental to an adequate land management law in Montana.
These include the public hearing, the workable standard, and judicial
review.
THE PROPOSA L

1.

A PUBLIC

HEARING

PROVISION

That a public agency, 3 such as the Land Board, should be required
by the public to provide safeguards to protect the public interest and
the public priorities may seem unusual. The growing tendency, however, is for public rights to be asserted, not by governmental agencies
aeling on behalf of the people, but by citizen groups claiming interests
to be protected, and a legal right to judicial enforcement. "Moreover,
these citizen groups frequently assert their rights against the very
governmental agencies which are supposed to protect the public interest. "s6
The question of whether a public agency is adequately protecting
the public on whose behalf it acts has been raised with increasing fre-

3The forwarding of notice to interested parties has been the customary procedure.
But see iRobbins, id. note 29.

-R.C.M.1947, § 81-104.

"This was noted in Thompson v. Babcock, supra note 22 at 54-56.
"Recalling, of course, the political composition thereof.
""'The absence of clear guides in organic legislation renders administrators particularily susceptible to pressure from narrow but well-organized interest groups and
may lead to a situation in which the dispositive consideration in determining whether
or not to grant a license application becomes the political connections of the applicant.'' Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1964).

5The Land Board is a public agency. See State v. State Board of Land Commissioners,
109 Mont. 127, 133, 94 P.2d 201 (1939). The Land Board is also an agency within
the meaning of that term as defined in the Proposed Montana Administrative Procedure Act.
OSax, supra note 16 at 136.
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quency, and by some notable legal personalities. In a Federal Communications ease the now Chief Justice Burger concluded:
The theory that the commission can always effectively represent
listener interests . . . without the aid and the participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to
work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. Whenever it
becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experience,
neither we nor the commission can continue to rely on it.7
Environmental considerations, by their very nature, constitute another strong argument for public hearings. They are inherently complex and are generally considered anti-economic. 38 Where the state
finds itself continually underfunded it turns to traditional sources for
new tax money, i.e., to new industry. Since the preservation of collateral land values is a capital-expending rather than a capital-acquiring
proposition, such considerations, strongly urged, often have a deterrent
effect on new industry. A governmental agency, acting alone, under
a preoccupation with the now need for income, too often overlooks
the tomorrow need for collateral resources. The public hearing has certain disadvantages, but it is nevertheless an important tool, and particularly to a planning agency.
The public hearing also serves other functions. It is generally given
lip-service credit as a cornerstone to democracy, providing a device
for citiz(n participation.:*" This function is too often understated. Public
hearings encourage and incubate an informed public. They provide an
opportunity for the citizen to "blow off steam," promote acceptance
of final determinations, and in so doing deter future adjudication.4 °
The public hearing also serves as a primary forum for informatin
gathering. 41 This is particularily important where, as here, the agency
must deal with noneconomie considerations and where, as here, the
subject matter is multifarious, highly complex, and requires great
synthesis.4 ' To the agency which assumes the affirmative burden of in-

"Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Church of Christ].
'It should be clear that I am speaking to only short-term gain, or immediate return.

Long term benefits are manifestly proportional to future land productivity. A development which destroys collateral land values diminishes future productivity and

constitutes a drain on long-term gain.

'Symposium-The Public Hearing, 21 ADMIN. L. Rzv. 125 (1968).
"Prize Winning Essay by F. W. Taylor, in Ph*i Delta Phi Brief at 169 (1970).
The recent developments in the private attorneys gencral-standing doctrine has
increased the availability of review to concerned citizens. Consequently, the deterrence
of post-administrative adjudication becomes an increasingly important consideration.
"See Symposium-Hearings, supra note 39 at 155.

"See Heddleston Hearings, supra notes 8-11. Relevant information was often highly
technical. Among those offering presentations were professors of law, economics,
geology, biology, zoology, a host of graduate students and well-informed citizen groups.
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quiry,43 the public hearing may lose a part of its potency as a source
of information. But where, as here, information must be supplied, the
public hearing is an invaluable tool. In the one party hearing that
information can only be one-sided. The cost of administration and the
time necessarily consumed may be reduced to a minimum, but the
public interest cannot be served.
Finally, the public hearing requirement may serve to impress upon
the agency, and the public, the fact that the matter before the agency
is something more than a preliminary inquiry or proceeding of little
or no significance.
This function may be particularly useful in the land use area,
where planning commissions spend (theoretically, at least) considerable amounts of meeting time on long range planning matters. . ."
There are, of course, disadvantages to a requirement of public
hearings. They are costly, both in expense and delay. But, all in all,
when the matter before the agency is inherently complex and significant.
as here, the agency should not begrudge the public, on whose behalf
45
it acts, the time and effort required to do the job properly.
The public hearing, therefore, is not only justifiable, but is particularly useful in the field of land management. If, however, we require
public hearings, we must venture one step further to insure that such
a requirement will be both viable and effective. Three elements of the
public hearing merit cursory attention.
A.

Notice

Unless interested parties are informed that public hearings will
be held on the matter before the Board, the hearing requirement is
little more than a shell. For this reason, the provision requiring public
hearings in land management decisions should include a provision for
notice thereof. This latter provision should express:

' 8Symposium-Hearings, supra note 39 at 122. Such a duty has also been imposed upon
the Federal Power Commission. "The failure of the Commission to inform itself of
these alternatives cannot be reconciled with its planning responsibilities under the
Federal Power Act." Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 622 (2nd Cir. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Scenic Hudson].
"Symposium-Hearings, supra note 39 at 154.
"GAs regards delay, an emergency-action provision should be incorporated into any
public hearing provision. Such a provision would permit immediate action under
exceptional circumstances, but allows the action to stand for only a limited period.
Within this time the Board should be required to invoke the proper procedures. ANN-.
CAL. Gov. CODE, §§ 11421 and 11422.1 (West 1966).
In addition, the public hearing need not be required as a condition precedent
to all Land Board action. It is this writer's opinion that the hearing requirement
could be effectively limited, without any loss of potency, by a requirement similar to
Wisconsin's, Wis. STAT. § 227.02, under which the public hearing is mandatory only
upon the request of twenty-five persons, or of a group whose membership represents
an equivalent number.
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1).

A minimum time element. Most such provisions require that
notice be sent from ten to thirty days prior to the commencement of the hearing. 46 The controlling considerations here are
twofold. A six month notice provision would severely encumber
the Land Board in its ability to act. A six day notice would
give interested parties no time to conduct independent investigations nor to prepare presentations. These considerations must
be balanced. Where, for instance, environmental considerations
are interwoven into the matter before the Board, the projected
development should be set forth in near final detail, and the
time allotted for preparation should be commensurate with
the complexity of the problem.

2).

The notice should be both published and sent individually to
all parties, and to all persons and groups who have signified
47
their interest by requesting such notice.

3).

The notice should include statements of time, place, and the
nature of the hearings, with reference to the legal authority
under which the hearing is to be held, reference to the statutes
and procedural rules involved therein, and a statement, in the
greatest possible detail, of the matters and issues to be con48
sidered.

B.

Standing

If the public hearing is to function most effectively in land management, all interested individuals must be permitted to participate
and be able to seek judicial review from final determinations of the
Land Board. Where noneconomic issues are implicit in the matter before
the Board, standing cannot be limited to those capable of showing an
economic interest in the outcome.49 Those who, by their activity and
conduct, have exhibited a special interest, should be given standing
in the proceedings5 0 In the management of public lands "standing is
accorded to persons not for the protection of their private interest, but
only to vindicate the public interest."'
At present, in both judicial and administrative proceedings, the
scope of standing is in flux. While some courts have granted standing

"See REVISED MODEL STATE ACT, § 3 (a) (1) and (2). See also 1 Cooper, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 187 (1965).
TSee REVISED MODEL STATE ACT, § 3 (a)
(1). See also ANN. CAL. Gov. CODE, § 11423
(West 1966); and Cooper, supra note 46 at 187.
"See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, § 9; and ANN. CAL. Gov.
CODE, § 11424 (West 1966).

"See Church of Christ, supra note 37 at 1002.
'See Scenic Hudson, supra note 43 at 617; and Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Federal Power

Comm., 216 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1954).
'Church of Christ, supra note 37 at 1006.
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in the absence of direct economic injury or of special statutes, 52 others
have adamently refused to do so.5' Considering the present state of
5 4

standing law, standing should be granted expressly by statute

to all

interested individuals, regardless of direct economic injury, in the
capacity of private attorneys general5 5 for and on behalf of the general
public interest in land management proceedings.5 6
C.

Evidence, Findings and the Record

When acting as a planning agency the Land Board must deal with
complex and diversified considerations.5 7 Collateral interests, such as
environmental protection, are nevertheless important facets of the comprehensive plan, 65 and require complete investigation. On the other
hand, decisions required in the management of public lands often evoke
highly emotional and irrelevant statements. Again, therefore, balance
must be sought. Rules on admissibility of statements and of extraneous
evidentiary matter must be designed in such a way that the irrelevant
may be weeded from the relevant, while assuming that information
commensurate with the complexity of the problem will be admissible
into the record.5 9 Since special interest proponents are likely to overstate their own concerns, a right to cross-examination would be useful6 "
and should be incorporated into the law.

'Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 P. Supp. 650, 661 (S.D. N.Y.
1967). See also Scenic Hudson, supra note 43; and Assoc. of Data Processing Service
Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
"Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
"''Only occasionally will courts, absent specific statutory authority, protect the interests
raised by increasingly aroused environmental groups.'' Sax, supra note 16 at 137.
'-Were this writer designing the standing provision he would simply give recognition to
the public attorneys general concept discussed by the now Chief Justice Burger in
Church of Christ, supra note 37.
'The fear often voiced by agencies, that liberal standing provisions would result in
"innundation by thousands" seeking to intervene and demand judicial review has been
expressly rejected. See Scenic Hudson, supra note 43 at 617. See also Assoc. Industries,
Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 707 (2nd Cir. 1942), vacated as moot, (320 U.S. 707, 708
(1943), 64 S.Ct. 74 (1943)) wherein it was noted that "no such horrendous possibilities
exist. ''
"7An understatement of those considerations involved in land management decisions is
revealed by pertinent considerations in highway planning, which include not only
highway engineering expertise, but considerations of scenic and aesthetic interests,
housing, demography, pollution control, and a panoply of other elements. Read Review,
supra note 52 at 660-62.
'See Heddleston Hearings, supra notes 8-11.
'The agency is not, of course, required to proceed within the evidentiary confines
established for courts. The rules of evidence section, 302 (A), of the Proposed Montana Administrative Procedure Act recognizes this, stating: "agencies shall not be
bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence."
The section would permit
the exclusion of ". . . irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence," although, as a general rule, the agency will follow a liberal policy in accepting evidence.
This, because a record silent on relevant considerations may sow the seed of remand
for rehearing, upon review of the decision.
"'It
is my conviction that the prospect of cross-examination imposes a discipline on
these economic judgments, together with the requirement of advance written preparations, which would not otherwise be possible." W.C. Burt, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 117
(1967).
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It is essential, of course, that the record be a complete repository of
hearing considerations."' There should be evidence, on the record, that
all issues and alternatives raised by the hearings received the consideration of the Land BoardG2 in accordance therewith, the Board should
be required to issue a statement of their reasons for accepting or rejecting all substantive points urged in the hearing.6 3 This will serve the
twofold purpose of reassuring the public that a responsible decision has
been made while simultaneously providing a complete record, should
judicial review be necessary. The record should, in short, reflect the
4
scope and depth of the hearing.
II.

A LAND MANAGEMENT STANDARD

Equally as vital to the responsible management of public lands is
the formulation of a more definite, more inclusive standard. There is
perhaps no tenet as fundamental to the administrative law student than
that requiring an agency to proceed within the limitations of a prescribed standard.65 The standard under which the Land Board presently
operates requires the Board "to administer this trust so as to secure
the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to the
state."66
This standard, as written, is potentially deleterious to comprehensive
land management. First, it is distressingly vague. While it may be
advantageous to permit the Land Board to operate under a standard
sufficiently general to allow its members reasonable freedom to weigh
the issues, public interest and public priorities, "there is a point at
which generality lnerges into vacuity. ' 67 The incorporation of certain
values into the standard does not, by necessity, narrow the agency's

"'If an administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to
rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not
do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action."
Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
Contrast this with the closing comments of Justice Castles in Thompson v. Babcock, supra note 32.
e2See Scenic Hudson, supra note 43 at 617.
'See Assoc. Industries, supra note 56 at 194. A failure here would erode the very
reasons for requiring public hearings, and would render judicial review virtually as
weak as it presently is. For this reason alone it is apparent that conclusions, without
supporting rationale, should not be permitted. Section 304 of the Proposed Montana
Administrative Procedure Act would appear to support such a requirement.
6. ... the Commission has claimed to be the representative of the public interest. This
role does not permit it to act as an umpire, blandly calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it." Scenic Hudson, supra note 43 at 621. The court
continued that the public was entitled to know upon the record, which would appear
to apply equally to hearings conducted in the management of public lands.
5U.S. v. Chicago, M., St. P., & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). See also 1 Davis,
ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, §§ 2.01 through 2.16 (1958) and 1 Cooper, STATE ADmix.
LAW, 54 through 91 (1965).
-R.C.M.1947, § 81-103.
IrKoslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (1970).
Although Mr. Koslow's reference was to such standards as "in the best interests of
the public", our "largest measure of advantage" formula certainly rivals public
interest standards for negligible identifiable content.
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range of choice. It is rather the assertion of "a more inclusive definition
of the goals or values which the agency must consider."6
Second, the present standard, when read in conjunction with corresponding constitutional and statutory provisions, delegates to the Land
Board virtually unlimited discretion.6 9 Discretion can be benevolent,
but it can also be tyrannical. Since a great proportion of the corruption
which mars American political life occurs in those agencies which engage
in planning and allocation, 70 this point must not be summarily dismissed.
Authorities contend that the failure lies not in the legislative delegation of broad discretionary powers, but rather in the failure of the
agencies, through their rule-making powers, to replace the vagueness
with clarity.7 ' The Land Board would appear to be no exception to
this rule, having promulgated and published regulations only in the area
of oil and gas leases. And where, as here, an agency is empowered to
give greater definition to its task 7 2 yet persists in procrastination, the
legislature should exercise no hesitancy in providing those guidelines
which the agency has failed to express.
Finally, a third and natural outgrowth of the present "largest ...
advantage" standard has been the tendency to interpret it strictly in

terms of economic advantages.1 3 Recent decisions74 have provided a
more generous verbal tribute to non-economic collateral issues,7 5 however
the Board still finds immediate pecuniary return to be the most alluring
consideration. Protection of the environment, enhancement of multiple
uses, public interest and public priorities are manifestly vexatious ini
terms of dollar and cents evaluation. 76 And yet the incorporation of
these, and such considerations as scenic and historical significance, into
the standards which presently govern other major administrative agencies, 77 renders clear their inherent value.

'Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227, 1249 (1966).
O'See Gravely, supra note 28.
'°Reich, supra note 68 at 1245. See also Hornsby, supra note 34.
'U Davis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 56 (1968).
'2E.g., 'The state board of land commissioners is hereby authorized to lease in such
manner as it may deem for the best interests of the state." R.C.M.1947, § 81-501.
See also Leuthold, supra note 28 at 104.
"Again, this writer refers to the short-term economic gain, as opposed to the longterm economic gain.
"Both of the Land Board, and of the court, sitting in review of the Land Board.
n5Thompson, supra note 32 at 53 and 54 coattained some hopeful language. The court
intimated that the Board must consider "preserving the productive capacity of the
land" and "that which will continually benefit the public in general." Even allusions
to maximum return were qualified by "with the least injury occurring to the land."
7',,... in many cases where unique and special types of recreation are encountered a
dollar evaluation is inadequate, as the public interest must be considered and it cannot
be evaluated adequately in only dollars and cents." Naniekagon, supra note 50 at 511.
This statement is manifestly applicable to public land management.
7See, e.g., the TRANSPORTATION ACT, 49 U.S.C. 1653 (f)
(Supp. IV 1968); the FISH
AND WILDLIFE COORDINATION ACT, 16 U.S.C. 662 (a) (1964) ; and the COLORADO RIVER
STORAGE PROJECT ACT, 43 U.S.C. 620 (b) and (g) (1964). See also ANN. CAL. STS.
AND H'WAYS CODE, § 210.1 (West 1969); and ANN. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 81 (West
1958). In Montana, see R.C.M. 1947, § 26-1501.
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The effect of omitting clear standards from land management law
can best be seen through its results. A standardless licensing statute
furnishes no uniform guide to which the agency must adhere when
acting as a planning organ of the state. That which is not required is
78
often not considered.
In addition, the omission of a statutory standard leaves the reviewing
court without a yardstick with which to measure the validity of decisions promulgated by the agency in accepting or rejecting considerations and alternatives. This, of course, leaves the agency, as here, free
to discriminate among alternatives in a manner that is virtually immune
79
to judicial review.
Before these statutes,: government followed a policy that allowed
the traditional agencies, such as highway departments, free to go
at their jobs with excessive singlemindedness, determined to find
the shortest, straightest, and cheapest routes, without sufficient
sensitivity to or knowledge about the other interests that their
projects affected.'

The standard to be adopted should require the Land Board to act
in a comprehensive manner, oriented toward the long range good. It
should require the Board to justify their final determinations in the
light of alternatives offered and issues raised. 8 ' Such factors as present
and future compatibility of the potential development with other legitimate land uses,8 2 and of the desirability of preserving scenic, historical,
and recreational values, should be expressed in the standard. 3 No infringement thereon should be permitted unless the record manifests
the absence of feasible alternatives while indicating that the development has been approved in a harm minimizing form. All lands, waters
and resources should be managed to the end that the same will be
available for all time, without change, except as may be necessary and
appropriate after the consideration of all factors involved. 4 The final
standard, in short, should reflect the scope of consideration expected
in the responsible management of public land, and should set forth
expressly those noneconomic values which might otherwise be overlooked
or summarily dismissed.

TSee Long, Arbitrary Administrative Decisions, 47

NEB.

L. REv. 459 (1968).

191 Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 77 (1965).

'Sax, supra note 16 at 138.
As was stated in Scenic Hudson, supra note 43 at 622, "The failure . . . to inform
itself of these alternatives cannot be reconciled with its planning responsibilities.''
The following quote from T. Roosevelt's letter appointing the Inland Waters Commission, 42 Cong. Rec. 6968 (1908), is expressive of the inclusiveness which this writer
would interject into a standard for the management of public lands: "Such a plan
should consider and include all the uses to which streams may be put, and should
bring together and coordinate the points of view of all users of waters."
sAs they have been in the standards which govern other planning agencies. See, e.g.,
•FED. AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1966, as amended, 23 U.S.C. 138 (Supp. IV 1968).:
'"See R.C.M.1947, § 26-1501, regarding state policy governing decisions on construction
and hydraulic projects affecting fish and game.
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JUDICIAL. REVIEW

The formulation of a more inclusive standard goes far toward rendering judicial review of Land Board decisions a true check on the management of public lands.8 5 While it would be convenient to consider
public agencies as infallible protectors of the public interest such is
not always the case. Judicial review is a necessary safeguard and
should be expressly incorporated into Montana land management law.
Review should be accessible to all interested persons, as private attorneys general, from any final decision of the Land Board. Review should
be based on the record, and where the record is incomplete the matter
should be remanded to the Board for further proceedings. The court, of
course, should not substitute its judgment for that of the Land Board,
but must be permitted to require that the Board's findings and conclusions be supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Land management law is particularly important in that it controls
the means by which our resources, and therefore our destiny, are to be
determined. In a field where comprehensive planning is imperative the
present law, moving from a basically sound constitutional foundation,
has received minimal development. Although the field is one involving
inherently complex collateral considerations, real public priorities, and
often intense public interest, public hearings are not required by law.
Where one decision may adversely affect not only future productivity,
but also unexploited collateral values, the Land Board operates under
a standard which offers virtually no statutory guidelines. Even a provision guaranteeing the right to judicial review is lacking.
The past management of public lands, where successful, has been so,
largely because its administrators have exhibited unusual responsibility
and foresight. We can no longer afford to proceed with a weak law
and a prayer for strong administrators. The time has come to incorporate, in land management law, those safeguards which are imperativ
to land management itself.
JAMES D. MOORE

"A rehearing provision, such as that included in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
8251 (a), might be incorporated, in order to preclude the possibility of premature
review.
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